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The calls for copyright reform at both the national and
international level are growing louder. Many authors, owners,
distributors, users, and consumers are dissatisfied with the current
regime, but solutions are not easy to find. Existing rules are
inadequate to deal with copyright in the digital world and partial
solutions are not likely to be durable. The problems of copyright are
not confined to one jurisdiction. Just as the creation and
dissemination of copyright works are global, copyright's legal problems
are an international problem. Existing international rules alone
cannot provide the solution to this policy debate, but they do have a
role. This Article analyzes the international framework and
determines that improved interpretation of the international rules
plays an important role. The Article determines that effective
interpretation of international agreements in order to achieve a broad
consistency about the object and purpose of copyright law can make a
substantive contribution to creating a durable solution to the
international copyright problem.
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I. COPYRIGHT STORIES
Copyright law internationally is awash with legal and practical
problems and divergent political views. This Article begins with three
familiar copyright stories that overlap and involve legal problems. In
addition to the well-known story that they tell, each has developed
related subplots in the last few years.
The first story tells how the music business has changed.
There have always been people who make money in the music
business and others that do not. But for much of the late twentieth
century, songwriters and record companies shared in profits more
equally than seems to be the case today.' Now, many artists and
creators, such as songwriters, musician, and singers, who contribute
to performances and recordings can no longer make money directly
from their copyright. However, these creators' endeavours once
informed the rationales that lie at the heart of copyright law's
protection of musical works.2
Many changes have taken place in the way music is recorded
and distributed, such as creators' capacity to self-publish and
1. See, e.g., Eddie Schwartz, Does Spotify Make Cents for Creators?, SONGWRITERS
ASS'N OF CAN., http://www.songwriters.ca/Article/120/details.aspx9/21/2012 [http://perma.cc/
YA6L-F9EY] (discussing how Spotify pays money to the music industry but very little of that
goes to creators); see also Fair Trade Music: Letting the Light Shine In, in THE EVOLUTION AND
EQUILIBRIUM OF COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL AGE (Susy Frankel and Daniel Gervais, eds., 2014),
315-16 (discussing how music could operate a fair trade system) [hereinafter EVOLUTION AND
EQUILIBRIUM].
2. See generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011). The
predominant rationale for copyright law is that the grant of exclusive rights for a limited time
provides a reward that incentivizes the creation of creative works. Others suggest that the
incentive need not be economic and thus requires protection of moral rights. In many
jurisdictions other than the United States, both economic and moral rights coexist. See Jeanne C.
Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV., 1745, 1747 (2012)
(suggesting that even in the United States economic and moral incentives are compatible, noting
that "expressive incentives can bolster the utilitarian inducement to create valuable intellectual
property").
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self-distribute; this means that recording studios and labels are no
longer, in theory, a necessity. Yet, even with this flexibility, many
creators are not making more money and may not even be making a
living wage.3 Also, there is a host of new distributors of legitimate
copies that are frequently not involved in owning the copyright in the
works that they distribute.
4
Music producers and distributors have also faced many
challenges, including technological developments.5 Both groups in
varying ways and degrees have adjusted to those developments.6 This
adjustment does not necessarily mean success; it may mean getting
out of the business.7 The central utilitarian rationale of copyright law
is that creators can be sufficiently rewarded that they are incentivized
to continue to create." Copyright has consequently been an important
tool in much economic activity of the creative industries.9 However,
3. See Schwartz, supra note 1.
4. Online service providers, such as Google or YouTube, that distribute copyright
works are examples. A different sort of distribution entity that does not own copyright includes
some streaming services. An example is Spotify which licenses, rather than owns, the copyright
in the content it makes available. This contrasts to the predominant business model in the
analog world where the record labels (and in other industries such as book publishers) owned
copyright and controlled distribution. See John Seabrook, Revenue Streams: Is Spotify the Music
Industry's Friend or its Foe?, THE NEW YORKER, (Nov. 24, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11 /24/revenue-streams fhttp:/Iperma.cc/9ZMU-
DH7A].
5. See JIM ROGERS, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
21 (2013) (discussing how the music industry has developed and how the digital revolution is
changing it); see also TIM Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH 13-14 (2010) (discussing the challenges of
the Internet in our society and particularly its role as a communicator and distributor of
information).
6. See TIM Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 97
(2010); see also Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One's Customers and the Dilemma of
Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725, 737-38 (2005) (giving
an overview of the decline of US music industry revenue).
7. Hughes, supra note 6, at 727 (explaining that one of the options for the music
industry is to "surrender" to illegal downloading).
8. See sources cited, supra note 2.
9. See Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47
ANTITRUST BULLETIN 423, 424 (2002), (noting that "[t]he copyright statutes reflect substantial
path dependence, as well as the play of powerful interests"); see also JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT 70 (2001) (commenting on the US 1976 Copyright Act, stating, "Most of it was
drafted by the representatives of copyright-intensive businesses and institutions, who were
chiefly concerned about their interaction with other copyright-intensive businesses and
institutions."). Additionally, one need only look at the response of the music industry to declining
revenues as requiring better enforcement of copyright to see the importance of copyright to the
music industry. See generally Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 695, 711 (2011) (discussing the industry data on infringement and its
self-perpetuating claims that infringement is massive and the appropriateness of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act as a response to those apparent increases. Bridy notes that "[t]here is,
however, some truth behind the hype. Notwithstanding the copyright industries' propensity to
exaggerate their losses, or the fastness and looseness with which their statistics are
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copyright's role is not to support incumbent business models, but
rather to support creativity. A key part of supporting creativity
should be for artists and creators (in copyright terms, the "authors")10
to make a living, even if what an author is-and the extent of that
rationale-is disputed.1
The second story is of how accessing and using images on the
Internet has become a part of life. The use of still images to identify
products or services (even where they relate to those images) and the
process of capturing and "re-communicating" moving images both
raise multiple copyright issues.12 This has caused courts to suggest
novel ways in which the use of an image is-or is not-an
infringement, or if the use is a fair use or a fair dealing that would not
amount to infringement and would not require a license or a payment
to the copyright owner.13
To answer, in any given situation, whether there has been fair
use requires navigating the thorny concept of transformative use.1 4
(re)circulated by uncritical government officials and media outlets, there can be little question
that P2P networks have facilitated large-scale infringement, or that the volume of files traded
illegally by means of such networks has been, and remains, large and revenue-depleting.").
10. "Authors" is a term which copyright law uses to incorporate artists and other
creators of copyright works. In some jurisdictions, "author" is defined to include producers of
sound recordings and films. See, e.g., Copyright Design and Patents Act 1988, c.48, §§ 9(2)(a)-(b)
(Eng.).
11. In this Article, "authors" is synonymous with creators (individuals and groups),
rather than corporate owners or distributors, which might otherwise be called cultural
businesses or industries. The role of authorship is seen as paramount by some. See Jane C.
Ginsburg, Exceptional Authorship: The Role of Copyright Exceptions in Promoting Creativity, in
EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM, supra note 1, at 15-28 [hereinafter Ginsburg, Exceptional
Authorship]; see also Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author's Place in the Future of Copyright, 45
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 381, 383 (2009) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Future of Copyright]; Jane C.
Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063,
1085 (2003) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Comparative Copyright]. Others contest that centrality of
authors. See, e.g., Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and
Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 188 (2008); see also THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP 359 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi, eds., 1994).
12. JOSEPH F. BAUGHER, ISSUES IN AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (2015).
The use of a still image (a photograph) may involve infringement of the photograph as a
reproduction. See id. The use of a moving image can involve infringement of multiple rights of
the image as a film and the underlying works within it. See id. If the image is a broadcast, then
the broadcast may be a separate copyright interest. This is the case in some jurisdictions, but not
in others such as the United States. See id.
13. INT'L JAMES JOYCE FOUNDATION, LEGAL DEFINITIONS: "FAIR USE" AND "FAIR
DEALING" (2012), https://joycefoundation.osu.edu/joyce-copyright/fair-use-and-permissions/about-
law/legal-definitions [http://perma.cc/6P8G-5E7V]. The doctrine of fair use is most associated
with the United States and fair dealing and or permitted acts with much of the rest of the world,
particularly the United Kingdom and other once British Commonwealth countries which have
adopted its laws including, Canada, Australia, Israel, Singapore, and New Zealand. See id. Fair
use and fair dealing will be used in this Article.
14. There is extensive literature on this topic. This Article does not aim to discuss the
scope of that doctrine. See, e.g., JANE GINSBURG AND ROBERT GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW (2012);
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The basic tenet is that if a use is transformative-meaning that a
change is made that significantly transforms the copyright work in
question-then that alteration may be a path to the legitimacy of that
use. There are two theoretical justifications for the transformative
use doctrine. First, a transformative use may be a new creative use in
its own right. Second, transformation suggests that the fair use
should not unduly interfere with the market for the original work.
15
This might involve the claim that the transformation results in a new
market.16 Some dispute that use of another's work for a new market
alone is a sufficiently transformative use that is consistent with the
incentivising creativity rationale of copyright law.17 The argument is
that the purpose of transformation should be a new creative work.'
8
Commentators suggest that market transformation is not
transformative use because the market rationale is not grounded in
copyright law.19  Rather, they suggest a new market is a
transformative purpose, but not as such a transformative use.20 In
international intellectual property law terms, unduly interfering with
the copyright owner's market conflicts with the normal exploitation of
the work.
21
WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE (2012 ed.); PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE AND PETER JASZI,
RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT 88 (2011); Matthew D.
Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The 'Transformative' Use Doctrine After Campbell, 7 COMM. L. &
POL'Y, 1 (2009); Neil W. Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS AND CLARK L. REV. 715,
715 (2011); P. Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2537 (2009).
15. See generally P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ AND MARTIN R.F. SENFTLEBEN, FAIR USE IN
EUROPE: IN SEARCH OF FLEXIBILITIES 15; see also GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
(Dec. 2006), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment-data/file/
228849/0118404830.pdf [http://perma.cc/F4XR-H2W6] [hereinafter GOWERS REVIEW] (proposing
Recommendation 11, which suggests that the relevant EU law "be amended to allow for an
exception for creative, transformative or derivative works, within the parameters of the Berne
Three Step Test").
16. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1164 (9th Cir. 2007)
(suggesting that the use of thumbnails of copyright photos was said to be transformative because
it created a new market).
17. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright 1992-2012: The Most Significant Development?, 23
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 465 (2013) (arguing that "[riecent cases evidence a
drift from 'transformative work' to 'transformative purpose'; in the latter instance, copying of an
entire work, without creating a new work, may be excused if the court perceives a sufficient
public benefit in the appropriation").
18. Id.
19. Id. at 490-91.
20. Id. at 489 (arguing that "[riecent cases evidence a drift from 'transformative work'
to 'transformative purpose'; in the latter instance, copying of an entire work, without creating a
new work, may be excused if the court perceives a sufficient public benefit in the
appropriation.").
21. This phrase is used in the second step in the three-step test for copyright
infringement found in The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
art. 9(2), Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (as last revised July 24, 1971, amended Sept. 28, 1979)
[hereinafter Berne Convention]; see Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
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Not all cases involve both types of transformation-a new
creative use or a new market for the original work-but a majority of
US fair use cases involve a finding of some kind of transformation.22
Despite its prevalence, there is a lack of consistency both in and
among several jurisdictions about what "transformative" means.23
Nevertheless, these two core themes, new use and no undue market
interference, are present in many jurisdictions as reasons to allow
third-party (i.e., free) uses of copyright works, although in varying
degrees and through differing legal mechanisms.24
A third and common tale of copyright's problems is that of
global versus territorial tensions. Copyright law is territorial, which
means that each country has an independent copyright law.25
Consequently, an owner of copyright in one country will own a
separate copyright in another country.26 For example, copyright in the
United States is only applicable in the United States. If a US
copyright owner requires protection of her work in New Zealand, she
will need to rely on New Zealand law.27 Whether dealing with a photo,
film, broadcast, music, or any other copyright work, legal complexity
arises from the dichotomy between a global market and territorial
law.28  Many copyright industries are global industries that are
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement]; discussion infra Part III.
22. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005,
156 U. PA. L. REV., 549 (2008) (finding that 96 percent of successful fair use cases involved a
finding of transformative use).
23. See AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
(2013), http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/copyright-and-digital-economy-dp-79
[http://perma.cc/5B5V-YHMR] [hereinafter COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY]
(summarizing various jurisdictions' approaches).
24. For a summary of fair use approaches in the United States, see Pamela Samuelson,
Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2544, 2602, 2610 (2007) (categorizing
transformative use into three groupings: (1) transformative--creating new works that use pre-
existing works, including parody and satire; (2) productive-such as quotation; and (3)
orthogonal-using copyright material in ways different in purpose from the original).
25. Berne Convention, supra note 21, art. 1(6) ('The works mentioned in this Article
shall enjoy protection in all countries of the Union" embodies his territorial principle which is
reinforced in art. 5(1) which states "(1) Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they
are protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of origin,
the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well
as the rights specially granted by this Convention.").
26. See Quality King Distribs., v. L'Anza Research Int'l, 523 U.S. 135, 154 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (approving the proposition that copyright protection is territorial).
27. Berne Convention, supra note 21, art. 5(3). For a further explanation of
territoriality, see SusY FRANKEL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN NEW ZEALAND 2.1.3 (2nd ed. 2011).
28. For a discussion of territoriality and some of its problems, see Graeme Dinwoodie,
Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality?, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 713-21 (2009).
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structured on territorial markets, which, in turn, are supported by
territorial copyright law. How any one industry structures its
distribution internationally may depend on many factors, such as
language, and in the non-digital world, distance is relevant. However,
as copyright law has territorial rules, businesses take advantage of
this and often charge different prices in different markets.
Territorial markets will often reflect legal boundaries; markets
may encompass one singular country or they may be regional, such as
the European Union.29 Copyright users are global in their uses and
consequently behave less territorially than the legal structure.30 The
reasons for this mix of the global and the territorial are complex and
can cause inconsistent results in dispute settlement as different courts
may reach different results on similar subject matter. From a right
holder's perspective, this incongruity is not efficient as it creates high
litigation costs.3 1  This circumstance, in turn, arguably creates
irrationally fragmented international law.32 Yet, at the same time,
the mix is sometimes desirable. There may, for instance, be
appropriate legal exceptions to meet the needs of a particular
jurisdiction, but those exceptions may not be appropriate globally.
Parody is an example. Humor often relies on cultural norms, which
differ between cultures and countries. Consequently, humor does not
always easily traverse borders. In some places, "imported" humor
may even offend.3 3 Despite globalization, we still see both practical
29. In particular, the markets are divided by preventing parallel importing. See Susy
Frankel, The Applicability of GATT Jurisprudence to the Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement,
in 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES 3, 20 (Carlos M. Correa ed., 2010) (discussing the compatibility of
preventing parallel importing and the free movement of goods principle under the WTO General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)). For a discussion of parallel importing in the United
States, see Irene Calboli, The United States Supreme Court's Decision in Kirtsaeng v. Wiley &
Sons: An "Inevitable" Step in Which Direction?, 45 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L.
75, 90 (2014).
30. There was, for example, no suggestion in cases involving file sharing, infra note 122,
that those who did the file sharing knew, or indeed cared to know, the jurisdictional source of the
copyright works that they shared.
31. See IP Litigation Costs-An Introduction, WIPO MAGAZINE, Feb. 2010, at 2
(outlining the costs of litigation in several jurisdictions including the United States and the
European Union and stating, "[Iln reality, for most litigants, one of the greatest obstacles
associated with IP litigation is high, if not excessive, costs.").
32. See, e.g., S. RICKETSON & J.C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 20.14-.15 (2d ed. 2006)
(discussing "territoriality and the problem of a multiplicity of possible laws"); see also Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 469, 522-80 (2000) (discussing how private law mechanisms in dispute resolution
should play a greater role in establishing international norms).
33. See Susy Frankel, From Barbie to Renoir: Intellectual Property and Culture, 41
VICTORIA UNIV. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 1, 7-9 (2009); Ellen Gredley & Spyros Maniatis, Parody:
20151
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and legal territorial elements to many aspects of culture, particularly
as national copyright laws (and intellectual property laws generally)
are applicable only in the jurisdiction in which they are enacted.34
Thus, the law is territorial in its scope and reach. To overcome
aspects of this territoriality, international agreements set minimum
standards to which territorial laws must conform.35  These
international agreements, particularly where they are multilateral,
are not a one-size-fits-all solution.36 However, they are sometimes
mistakenly characterized that way when described as harmonization
agreements. Harmonization implies the same law in all jurisdictions
at the domestic level, whereas minimum standards recognize that
there are different methods of implementing copyright law so that all
countries that are members of an international agreement have
reached a minimum standard, even if the expression of those
standards in national laws is different.37 These copyright stories point
to a number of difficulties with the international copyright system.
This Article analyzes how the international copyright system,
particularly the structural relationship between rights and exceptions,
contributes to copyright's problems at domestic law and how,
therefore, the international system could play a greater role in
addressing the problems illustrated by the above stories. Part II
discusses the development of copyright in the digital era and in the
face of evolving technology. It outlines the participants in the current
copyright regime and their role in changing the modes of distribution
of copyright works. As many of the new distributors in copyright rely
on copyright exceptions for their business model, this Part introduces
A Fatal Attraction of Parody and Its Treatment in Copyright, 19 EUR. INTELL. L. REV. 339, 340
(1997).
34. Berne Convention, supra note 21, at art. 5.
35. This is how international intellectual property law is structured. See, e.g., TRIPS
art. 1.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop e/tripse/tLagmOe.htm fhttps://perma.cc[BU6W-J77W] ('Members shall give effect to the
provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law
more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does
not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.").
36. The TRIPS Agreement, art. 1.1, provides that members are "free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal
system and practice." Id. Subsequent to the TRIPS Agreement, some free trade agreements
prescribe more detail of the minimum standards, and this comes closer to prescribing the details
of national law. That approach is consequently closer to a harmonized law model than the TRIPS
Agreement-style minimum standards. The same approach to implementation of minimum
standards is true of the Berne Convention, supra note 21, art. 20.
37. See TRIPS, supra note 35, art 1.1. As countries are free to determine the mode of
implementation of minimum standards in international agreements, this will inevitably result in
differences in national laws. This framework allows for calibration strategies to meet local needs
within the international framework. See Daniel Gervais, Intellectual Property Calibration, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 86, 87 (Daniel Gervais, ed., 2d ed. 2014).
[Vol. 18:1:39
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the relationship between exceptions and rights, illustrating how that
relationship should be interpreted. Part III discusses some of the
partial fixes, both existing and proposed, for copyright law at the
national level and how those fixes can divert attention from the
central international copyright problem. Part IV explains copyright's
framework problem, part of which is the relationship between the
protections and exceptions.
Neither protections nor exceptions are appropriately flexible,
and neither have properly framed the struggle for the closest possible
thing to technological neutrality. The result is that some business
models have been devised around the best way to avoid copyright
rules, rather than supporting creativity or technology-driven
incentives to achieve outcomes or deliver a service. While a certain
amount of planning around the rules and innovating in the gaps left
by others is to be expected, difficulties have emerged. While the
encouragement of creators and innovators to work around others is
part of what intellectual property incentives anticipate, legal
workarounds do not always produce innovation. Business models
being devised around the gaps may involve avoidance as the primary
driver of innovation, rather than innovation as a positive in its own
right. Put differently, copyright is becoming a tax avoidance model,
38
where rule avoidance, rather than the intended policy incentives, is
the key driver. In discussing this problem, Part IV includes discussion
of two stances that often feature in disputes and debates as polar
opposites; both of these stances contain truths, but also many fictions.
These notions are: (1) the invention of the copyright owners' right to
control copying, distribution, and all forms of communication in all
circumstances and (2) the invention of users' rights and the public
domain. Part V explains how part of copyright's problem stems from
the way in which the relationship between exceptions and rights is
framed and interpreted both domestically and internationally. This
38. This sort of exploitation of the rules by falling between the gaps is an anticipated
effect of any regulatory regime. Finding the loophole may be recognized as an ideal mode in some
regimes, but in others such as copyright, arguably it incentivizes avoidance, rather than the
object and purpose of the law of incentivizing creativity and innovation. The two may coincide,
but not necessarily. In tax law, avoidance, while often legitimate, is distinct from evasion. See
Joel Seidenberg, The Rule of Intellectual Property Law in the Internet Economy, 44 HouS. L. REV.
1073, 1084 (2007) (discussing the battle over rulemaking and normative responses in the
Internet economy); Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 708-09 (2003) (giving
examples of how code designers define behavior to avoid legal sanction); Rebecca Giblin & Jane
C. Ginsburg, We Need to Talk About Aereo: Copyright-Avoiding Business Models, Cloud Storage
and a Principled Reading of the 'Transmit' Clause 22 (Columbia Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies,
Working Paper No. 480, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2443595 [http://perma.cc/T5XG-CBK3];
Rebecca Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, Asking the Right Questions in Copyright Cases: Lessons from
Aereo and its International Brethren 11 (Columbia Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Working
Paper No. 504, 2014), http:/ssrn.com/abstract=2539142 [http://perma.cc/M3YH-JZYD].
2015]
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Part examines aspects of the exclusive rights or "normal exploitation"
and their relationship with the exceptions and shows how this
relationship is not well framed.3 9 Consequently, at the international
level, this relationship has become a problem of interpretation. The
Article concludes that improving interpretation at the international
level should assist with the problems of the scope of copyright and its
exceptions in national laws. Just as improvements at a national level
are sometimes reflected in international agreements, the international
regime can contribute to improved national interpretation.
II. NEW TECHNOLOGY, NEW PLAYERS AND NEW FORMS OF
DISTRIBUTION: SO, WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?
Without a doubt, developments in technology, new uses of
creative works, and new modes of distribution of those works have
changed copyright forever. The relationship between changing
technology and copyright's difficulty in adjusting to change is not
entirely new. It has been a tension that has existed in technological
transitions such as piano roll to sound recording,40 photostat to
photocopier,41 film to video,42 and broadcast to cable.43 It is possible to
see copyright's current difficulties as another chapter in copyright law
that is not quite keeping up with the progress of technology. However,
the current difficulties differ from some of the historic ones, as current
39. Normal exploitation is a concept found in the three-step test allowing limitations
and exceptions to copyright, meaning that such limitations and exceptions do not amount to
infringement. See TRIPS, supra note 35, at art. 13; Berne Convention, supra note 21, at art. 9(2).
40. In the United States, there still exists a compulsory license provision originally
designed for piano rolls. See A Case Study for Consensus Building: The Copyright Principles
Project: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. and the Internet Comm.,
113th Cong. 10 (2013) (statement of Prof. Daniel Gervais, Vanderbilt University Law School)
[hereinafter Statement of Prof. Daniel Gervais].
41. A photostat was often a single copy. Photocopying gave rise to the possibility of
making multiple copies of literary and some artistic works, which would either be infringing or
amount to fair use depending on the circumstances. This also led to the establishment of
collecting societies to collect royalties where multiple copies of works were made. See, e.g., Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994) (multiple copies of works made
for business purposes held not to amount to fair use). A key factor in the court's determination
under 17 U.S.C. § 107 was the availability of a relevant licensing scheme and thus the effect on
that market or the work. Id.; see also William Patry, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco,
Inc.: Copyright and Corporate Photocopying, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 429, 449 (1995).
42. See Frankel, supra note 33, at 10-11 (citing Jack Valenti's testimony to the US
Congress that video would ruin the film industry).
43. When entities other than the original broadcasters started to retransmit broadcasts,
British copyright law extended protection to broadcasts. See Copyright Act 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2 c.
74, § 14(1)(a) (Eng.). A similar extension to make cable programmers copyright works was
enacted in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 1(a) (Eng.) (amended 2003). See
Brad Sherman & Leanne Wiseman, Facilitating Access to Information: Understanding the Role
of Technology in Copyright Law, in EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM, supra note 1, at 221, 227.
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issues are about more than just changes in technology that affect
copying.
While the Internet has certainly challenged the functionality
and consequent utility of copyright as a means of controlling
reproduction, the big changes are not simply those that make
reproduction easy. There are other factors, most notably the new
modes of distribution and communication that are cheaper, more
efficient, and reach a greater audience. In many spheres of activity,
distribution and communication are now more significant than
reproduction.44 After all, digital distribution does not always require
reproduction. Making the work available either for download (which
involves reproduction) or streaming (which may not necessarily
involve reproduction) is more common than reproduction of copies in
the traditional sense of making multiple hard copies.45 Additionally,
self-publication is possible and so authors now do not need to rely on a
production agreement and on publishers and producers for
distribution, or communication, of their works. Instead, authors
primarily face two new challenges: generating attention in a market
saturated with creators of many different kinds and making money
directly from their work. Recording companies and even radio-play, or
"air-time," used to take on the attention-grabbing role. While
consumer preferences were key, recording companies could funnel
what was played to the public because they chose who to record and
produce.46 Those artists not chosen would have little ability to self-
record and distribute their works.47  Now, consumers frequently
indicate their preferences in different ways online via blogging,
"liking," and commenting. This gives significant power to the public
(the crowd), who increasingly develop views regarding copyright and
who should benefit from it. Copyright is no longer just a commercial
transaction between producers and creators; the public has an interest
44. Ernest Miller & Joan Feigenbaum, Taking the Copy Out of Copyright, YALE UNIV.
COMPUTER SCI. (2001), http://www.cs.yale.edu/homes/jf/MF.pdf [http://perma.cc/4QPJ-4G7T]
(discussing how distribution, even in the non-digital world, can occur without copying and
asserting tht copyright is not about the right of reproduction per se).
45. This description of the shift from analog to digital is further detailed in Peter
Menell's Can Our Current Conception of Copyright Law Survive the Internet Age?: Envisioning
Copyright Law's Digital Future. 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 104-18 (2003).
46. See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL You NEED To KNow ABOUT THE MusIc BUSINESS 74
(8th ed. 2012) ("Historically record companies held the key to the kingdom.... []t takes a large
organization to manufacture and ship records to stores .... Also in order to really sell records
you had to get your music on the radio.").
47. DIANNE RAPPAPORT, A MusiC BUSINESS PRIMER 190 (2003) (describing how the
record business worked).
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in copyright, and they may even wish to know who receives the money
for the purchase of copyright works.48
As noted above, another difficulty that many authors and
creators face is how to make money, let alone a living, from their
works. For example, the current payment to music-related authors,
even when there is some licensing, suggests that the proliferation of
cultural works for non-payment is unsustainable.49 To be sure, there
has developed an amateur culture, which is sometimes high quality.
The extensive availability of free amateur (and even sometime
professional) copyright works is not an answer to the struggle of the
professional author or creator. Put differently, the rise of amateur
culture does not logically mean that professional authors should not
be able to generate a living from their work or that the amateur
should replace, and be an effective substitute for, the professional.50
New modes of distribution and new uses of copyright works
have correlated with an expansion of persons interested in copyright
law. Unlike the business models of the late twentieth century,
publishers and producers no longer comprise the totality of key
distributors of copyright material. The distributors of the twenty-first
century include twentieth century entities that have adjusted to the
times,51 as well as newer business entities that have no ownership
interest in copyright but have an interest in the flexibilities of
copyright. For instance, a business model might extensively utilize
exceptions to copyright law, such as fair use, in order to make works of
others available online.5 2 These businesses include small and large
48. See Statement of Prof. Daniel Gervais, supra note 40, at 5.
49. See Schwartz, supra note 1.
50. For further discussion of the development of amateur content (often called user
generated content), see Niva Elkin-Koren, User-Generated Platforms, in WORKING WITHIN THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 111, 118-19 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diane L.
Zimmerman & Harry First, eds., 2010) (discussing the emergence of user generated content and
its challenges to the copyright regime); Daniel J. Gervais, User-Generated Content and Music
File-Sharing: A Look at Some of the More Interesting Aspects of Bill C-32, in FROM "RADICAL
EXTREMISM" TO "BALANCED COPYRIGHT": CANADIAN COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL AGENDA 447-75
(Daniel Gervais ed., 2010); see also Rebecca Tushnet, I Put You There: User-Generated Content
and Anticircumvention, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 889, 889-946 (2010) (discussing user-
generated content and its connection with fair use in the context of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act).
51. Notably, where these businesses were once only distributors, now they are also
content owners (copyright owners). See Niva Elkin-Koren, After Twenty Years: Revisiting
Copyright Liability of Online Intermediaries, in EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM, supra note 1, at
29, 48 (discussing how the immunity given to online service providers was based on their role as
neutral conduits of information and how that neutrality has changed over the twenty years,
particularly as the same conduits now control information and are not mere conduits, but are
also content providers).
52. Their business model may be dependent on the existence of a copyright exception.
See Ginsburg, Exceptional Authorship, supra note 11, at 1.
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entities, now interested parties in copyright law that are not authors
or necessarily even rights owners, such as online service providers and
streaming companies. Some argue these parties therefore have less
interest, while others put new distributor interests on par with, or
even beyond, those of the traditional copyright stakeholders.
53
Evaluating how these interests interact has been a tricky process.
One solution involves some ranking among the competing interests,
but ranking is not likely to be the best primary analytical tool. If
there is an interest to be protected, the mode of protection is not
determined by whether it is more or less important than another
interest (a proposition which is hard to measure in any event).
Rather, an effective analysis should consider how any interest and
corresponding related interests could all be appropriately
accommodated.
The responses of those with an interest in copyright to the
changes in the online world have been varied. Some traditional
copyright owners have adapted to change, while others have sought to
increase the strength of owners' rights and have focused on
enforcement.54 Those seeking greater access to copyright works have,
when looking at the law, advocated for greater flexibility and more
exceptions.55  But these sorts of "fixes" are partial at best and
counter-productive at worst. If you want to reform copyright, a
broader approach is needed. And if you want to profit from your
copyright, then enforcement has a role, but availability of legitimate
copies or access to them has proven to be of more importance.
The territoriality of copyright law has allowed copyright
owners to decide when different regions receive access to works, to
divide markets, and to differentiate products in those markets if they
53. Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 829, 837
(2008) (arguing that "fair use creates incentives for technology companies to build innovative
new products that enable ... copying. Far from being an unfair 'subsidy' from copyright owners
to technology innovators, this aspect of fair use has yielded complementary technologies that
enhance the value of copyrighted works. This fair use incentive to technology companies,
moreover, is justified in light of a persistent market failure that would otherwise result in
underproduction of certain kinds of socially-beneficial innovations.").
54. See TRIPS, supra note 35, at art. 42, 61 (instituting in part III minimum standards
for civil and criminal enforcement of intellectual property rights into the international regime for
the first time). Attempts have been made to expand those provisions in the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA), Oct. 1, 2011, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/
i_property/pdfs/actall05_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/86EB-EP6H], and in subsequent free trade
agreement negotiations. See generally Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What
Enforcement?, 52 IDEA: THE J. OF LAW & TECH. 239 (2012). The US proposal in the Trans-Pacific
Partnership includes increased enforcement provisions. Trans-Pacific Intellectual Property
Rights Chapter, art. 1, 6, http://tppinfo.org/resources/leaked-texts-country-info/
[http://perma.cc/BZE5-8XLN].
55. See infra Part II ("Those who seek more flexibility have also built on the existing
framework primarily by increasing exceptions relating to fair use or permitted acts.").
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choose.56 In some instances, this approach to access has resulted in
international price discrimination and high profit levels.5 7 But this
method of controlling access should be, and sometimes has been,
recognized as inefficient and redundant in a truly global world.58 This
is especially true where illegitimate access has sometimes been
possible before legitimate access is available.59 It is widely recognized
that the failure of the music industry to provide access to legitimate
copies of works at a reasonable price did not result in consumers not
accessing music; non-authorized access to music, particularly via file
sharing, became common.60 Paying services that are provided or
licensed by the music industry now compete with these
copyright-infringing services.61  Put differently, global protection
comes with the cost that those who inhabit the globe expect legitimate
access to those protected works. This cost is really a benefit because of
the potential of increases in sales.62
56. Parallel importing disputes have sometimes turned on whether the manufacturer or
distributor made different products for different markets. See Colgate Palmolive Ltd v. Markwell
Finance Ltd [1989] RPC 497 at 519 (CA); see also SUSY FRANKEL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
NEW ZEALAND 104-07 (2nd ed. 2011) (discussing how these sorts of parallel importation disputes
do not seem to turn on intellectual property related principles, but rather corporate structure).
57. That is what ownership of copyright can result in. Owners will charge what the
market can pay. For example, in small economies, the price is likely to be higher because of the
relatively small number of players and the resulting lessening of competition. See SusY
FRANKEL, TEST TUBES FOR GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES 159-84 (2015) ("Why Small
Market Economies Do and Don't Parallel Import"); see also Michael J. Meurer, Price
Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV.
845, 877 (1997) (discussing how copyright facilitates price discrimination and the relationship
between price discrimination and profit).
58. This is why many countries allow parallel imports. See Susy Frankel, Chris Nixon,
Megan Richardson & John Yeabsley, The Challenges of Trans-Tasman Intellectual Property
Coordination, in RECALIBRATING BEHAVIOUR: SMARTER REGULATION IN A GLOBAL WORLD 125,
125 (Susy Frankel & Deborah Ryder eds., 2013) ("By lifting the restrictions governing parallel
imports, government's objectives are designed to change the way market participants behave,
that is, to act more competitively, thereby reducing prices and improving consumer welfare.").
59. Long before the iTunes store or equivalents were available in the United States and
other countries, peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing was possible. iTunes was established in the
United States in 2003. See Mark Harris, iTunes Store History, ABOUT,
http://mp3.about.com/od/history/p/iTunes-History.htm [http://perma.cc/4DKR-Y64F]. The
Napster litigation began in 2000. See REBECCA GIBLIN, CODE WARS: 10 YEARS OF P2P SOFTWARE
LITIGATION 1-2, 17 (2011) (analyzing the P2P litigation and how copyright law evolved in
response).
60. GIBLIN, supra note 59, at 1-4 (explaining why P2P software developed and was not
closed down by litigation).
61. See Glynn S. Lunney, Copyright on the Internet: Consumer Copying and Collectives,
in EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM, supra note 1 at 285, 289 (discussing how "file-sharing traffic
has increased consistently and substantially in absolute terms over the last ten years").
62. There may be some instances where copyright should prevent access where the
author has not authorized anyone to have access, such as the use of unpublished works.
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When fans (consumers) seek access to music (in copyright
terms, musical works and sound recordings), those fans most probably
have no inkling-or do not care-that there are different copyright
interests, let alone that those interests vary from territory to territory.
Copyright works operate in a global market, and copyright law divides
that realm into multiple submarkets. This division has always
created a copyright dichotomy. However, the consequences of the
difficult coexistence of global consumers and territorial copyright are
exacerbated in the online world. The tensions at the domestic level
between authors, owners, users, and distributors are not only found in
national settings around the globe, but have increasingly become
international. This has contributed to the need for renewed
international interest in improving international rules relating to
copyright.
Against this backdrop, bilateral and regional trade agreements
have continued to increase copyright protection standards and
enforcement measures by adding to the existing model.63 Those who
seek more flexibility have also built on the existing framework
primarily by increasing exceptions relating to fair use or permitted
acts.6 4 Many have advocated for complete reviews of the copyright
system, but shifts within the existing model have been the primary
vehicle for change. This approach seems to have resulted in partial
fixes or suggestions for partial fixes, both nationally and
internationally. However, partial fixes will not be enough to address
the multiple problems that have emerged in copyright, including the
problems that authors and creators experience in trying to make a
living from their creative works.
65
Legislation and international agreements are not the only ways
that copyright can be reformed, nor should they necessarily be the key
drivers of reform. Social norms and business practices are
fundamental, and rightly the law should follow these. In the
63. See, e.g., Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004,
43 I.L.M. 1248; United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Kor., June 30, 2007,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-ftafinal-text
[http://perma.cc/96E9-43SC]; Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, supra note 54.
64. For an example of a trade agreement at the international level, see, e.g., Marrakesh
Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired, or
Otherwise Print Disabled, art. 11, June 28, 2013 [hereinafter Marrakesh],
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/marrakesh [http://perma.cc/YX6Y-9647]. For an example of a
trade agreement at the national level, see, e.g., The Case for Fair Use in Australia in COPYRIGHT
AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 23, at 4.
65. See Jane C. Ginsburg, From Hypatia to Victor Hugo to Larry & Sergey: "All the
world's knowledge" and Universal Authors' Rights, Public Lecture, Victoria University of
Wellington (Oct. 2014) (suggesting that it may be a utopian ideal to have universal authors'
rights, but this is what we strive for).
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ever-changing environment of the Internet and online distribution,
copyright law, as the stories at the beginning of this Article show, has
been shown to be inadequate, causing a wave of copyright reviews.66
In these circumstances, interpretation of the scope and
limitations of existing legal rules is more important than ever.
Interpretation is the job of lawyers, courts, and policy makers. So
while legal rules alone do not provide a "solution," better
interpretation of legal rules is an important contribution to addressing
the copyright problem. This is not just a matter for domestic courts
and policy makers; it is also an international matter. Interpretation
that is consistent with the object and purpose of copyright law (and in
international agreements, with the object and purpose of the relevant
treaty or convention)67 should yield more consistent results and may
be described as "better" than interpretation that ignores or sidelines
the objectives of copyright law.
Although interpretation of rules at the international level is a
different function from national interpretation by legislators and
deciders of disputes, the two are linked.68 The role of those that
interpret the law and the importance of consistent interpretation
methods, as this Article identifies, are important aspects of creating
durable rules to address the problems that international copyright law
faces. A complexity is that the issue of what amounts to the object
and purpose of copyright law has become a matter of disagreement
among commentators, some of whom advocate dissemination of works
as more important than rewarding works,69 or that copyright "is not
interested in people making a living, it's interested in promoting
creativity, '70 and others who suggest rewarding authors is the
66. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160 (9th Cir 2007); Frankel,
infra note 68 at 1, 3.
67. The customary rules of interpretation of international treaties are the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT]. The core part of art. 31 provides: "A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."
68. See Susy Frankel, The Path to Purpose-Driven TRIPS Interpretation: A Hermeneutic
of International Intellectual Property, (forthcoming 2016).
69. Lunney, supra note 61, at 310 (arguing that reward to the copyright owner is
secondary to the Constitutional Purpose in the United States "to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts," quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 cl. 8). The two, however, are linked. The
Supreme Court said that "copyright provides the economic incentive to create and disseminate
ideas." Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888-89 (2012) (citations omitted).
70. Lawrence Lessig and Eileen McDermott, The Great Copyright Debate, MANAGING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Mar. 1, 2009), http://www.managingip.comlArticle/2113271/The-great-
copyright-debate.html [http://perma.cc/LC4D-HUR5].
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predominant concern.71 That said, there are some objectives of the
regime-such as copyright's aim to incentivize authorship and
creativity-that are recognized even by those at polar opposites of the
debate. One commentator who disputes the need for copyright's
extension to private uses questions whether copyright needs to extend
to such uses in order to incentivize authors or whether incentivizing
technology is enough.72 Part of that argument is that copyright can
incentivize authors.7 3 Those in favor of copyright (for authors and
creators) see the incentive aim as critical and as underpinning why
creators should achieve some remuneration through online uses of
their work.74 These differing views and this seeming impasse over the
objective and purpose of copyright law has spawned a variety of
partial reform suggestions.
III. PARTIAL FIXES AND THE CENTRAL PROBLEM
Partial copyright fixes can divert attention from the core need
to make copyright work. There is a central problem in copyright that
needs to be addressed in a holistic and principled way, as the problem
is more than the mere inflexibility or inadequate strength of
copyright.
Many copyright owners have adjusted to the Internet
environment. However, the lack of effective enforcement remains an
issue for copyright owners (often business entities). For many authors
and creators, the lack of any effective return, even for popular works,
is a serious issue. The people who are doing well are modern
distributors in the online world. From a non-legal perspective, the key
to making copyright work is for interested parties to learn to live with
each other and adjust to change. Learning to coexist would
undoubtedly be easier if the law supported a fair return for everyone.
Fairness is important here, because it should not be the business of
copyright to support redundant business models. Instead, it should be
the business of copyright to reward those who provide the raw inputs
of the copyright world. From a legal perspective, partial fixes do not
go to the core of addressing the imbalanced nature of the international
copyright system. Fixes may cure some significant symptoms, but
71. Ginsburg, Exceptional Authorship, supra note 11 (responding to Lessig's comment,
Ginsburg stated "as if creation will spontaneously sprout in even the most nutrient-starved
soil").
72. See Lohmann, supra note 53, at 839-40.
73. See id., at 843-44 ("Generally speaking, copyright law creates property interests to
encourage creators, distributors, and the public to engage in a series of market transactions that
will result in the creation and distribution of, and wide public access to, creative works.").
74. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Exceptional Authorship, supra note 11, at 2.
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some core features are circumvented. That does not mean that fixes
cannot be useful, but usefulness does not overcome their partialness.
It is possible to critique copyright by referencing its rules, the
roles that people and businesses play, its justifications, and a
combination of these factors. Such values often lie behind some of
copyright's current proposals for partial fixes.75 These include, for
example, reconsidering the subject matter of both copyright and
formalities and utilizing the notion of commercial harm as a key
aspect of infringement. A brief discussion of these "fixes"
demonstrates how they are unlikely to address or rebalance the core
copyright framework problem.
A. Subject Matter and Formalities
The subject matter of copyright has shifted. It no longer gives
rights only to authors or owners of works. Instead, it has add-on
subject matter, such as protection of technological protection
mechanisms76 and rights management information.77 By and large,
these sorts of add-ons have not meant that copyright owners have
control over distribution and communication of their works. If they
did, file sharing and online piracy arguably would not have become an
issue. In other words, these technological protection mechanisms
have not improved enforcement.
75. There have been several reviews around the world directed at reforming national
copyright laws. Examples include: GOWERS REVIEW, supra note 15, at 1; see also Taking Forward
the Gowers Review: Proposed Changes to Copyright Exceptions 1, 1 (2010). For an Australian
example, see COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 23, at 5. These detailed reports
focus on exceptions. In the United States, the copyright principles project analysed key
principles. See Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Principles Project: Directions For Reform, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1181 (2010). Francis Gurry, Director General of WIPO, has called for
a review of copyright. See Francis Gurry, The Future of Copyright, Speech at Blue Skies
Conference on Future Directions in Copyright Law, Sydney (Feb. 2011),
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/dgo/speeches/dg-blueskyconf1ll.html [http://perma.cc/ZP5N-
U89S] [hereinafter Gurry, Blue Skies] ('The enticing promise of universal access to cultural
works has come with a process of creative destruction that has shaken the foundations of the
business models of our pre-digital creative industries. Underlying this process of change is a
fundamental question for society. It is the central question of copyright policy. How can society
make cultural works available to the widest possible public at affordable prices while, at the
same time, assuring a dignified economic existence to creators and performers and the business
associates that help them navigate the economic system? It is a question that implies a series of
balances: between availability, on the one hand, and control of the distribution of works as a
means of extracting value, on the other hand; between consumers and producers; between the
interests of society and those of the individual creator; and between the short-term gratification
of immediate consumption and the long-term process of providing economic incentives that
reward creativity and foster a dynamic culture.").
76. WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNRIDC/94
[hereinafter WCT].
77. Id. at art. 12.
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Subject matter also varies. In jurisdictions outside the United
States, including the United Kingdom and Europe, broadcasts78 and
"cable programmes"79 (which are, in effect, modes of distribution) have
also attracted protection as separate copyright works from the content
that they contain. This is significant because it means that
reproduction-not just public performance-is an exclusive right of
broadcast and cable program owners.80 For countries that do not
protect these sorts of matters as works, but protect the underlying
works, international agreements still require communications to be
protected.81 It is notable that categorization of subject matter may
make a difference to the way a case is argued and the litigated
outcomes.8 2  However, as discussed below, a better and more
consistent approach to interpretation of international agreements
should not produce this fragmented result.
8 3
Some have proposed that copyright subject matter would be
better if formalities are used, such as registration of copyright.8 4 In
particular, they suggest that copyright should not exist without
registration.8 5  Formalities would address not only the perceived
problem of too much copyright, but also address issues such as orphan
78. See, e.g., Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, § 1(b) (U.K.) (providing that
copyright exists in broadcasts, which § 6(1) defines as "an electronic transmission of visual
images, sounds or other information which-
(a) is transmitted for simultaneous reception by members of the public and is capable of
being lawfully received by them, or
(b) is transmitted at a time determined solely by the person making the transmission for
presentation to members of the public .... ").
79. See, e.g., id. at § 7 (now repealed, defining "cable programme").
80. The UK model is found in several countries including New Zealand. There the
approach to subject matter is even broader as copyright law no longer distinguishes between
broadcasts and "cable programmes," but groups them as "communication works." See Frankel,
supra note 68, at 225-29.
81. WCT, supra note 76, art. 8 ('"Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 11(1)(ii),
1 ibis(1)(i) and (ii), 1 lter(1)(ii), 14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1) of the Berne Convention, authors of literary
and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the public
of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their
works in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a
time individually chosen by them.").
82. If the broadcast ransmission or signal is protected as a work, then reproducing the
signal will likely be an infringement of that work. Thus, the analysis in a case such as Am.
Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2498, 2512 (2014) (Scalia, J. dissenting) might be more of a
secondary/contributor infringement analysis in other jurisdictions as there arguably would be an
infringing reproduction.
83. See discussion infra Part IV.
84. See, e.g., Chris Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487
(2004). For a contrary view, see Jane C. Ginsburg, With Untired Spirits and Formal Constancy:
Berne- Compatibility of Formal Declaratory Measures to Enhance Title-Searching, 28 BERKELEY
TECH L. J. 1583, 1621 (2013).
85. Sprigman, supra note 84, at 497, 550.
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works.8 6 Some aspects of formalities, such as recording ownership,
would in many instances be useful; however, some other aspects of
formalities, such as their requirement for the existence of copyright,
may not be so useful for all owners or users of copyright works.8 7
Leaving aside the international agreement limitations on
formalities,88 using formalities to create ownership-as distinct from
recording ownership-would change the landscape of copyright, and
not necessarily for the better. There are multiple potential models of
formalities, but one problem is the existence of competing registries,
such as different repertoires for collecting societies8 9 from those of
copyright offices where they exist.90 But even if formalities were
introduced (or reintroduced where they previously existed), it seems
likely that individual authors and small or medium businesses would
form the bulk of those who lose their copyright through failure to
register.91 This has been a demonstrated effect in relation to patents
that are not as often used by small and medium enterprises as
86. Orphan Works, CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN,
http://web.law.duke.edu/cspd/orphanworks.html [http://perma.cc/PBM6-8ANY] (defining orphan
works as a problem resulting from lack of copyright records). For a suggestion of how to remedy
the situation, see David R. Hansen et al., Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the United
States, 37 COLuM. J. L. & ARTS 1, 1 (2013) (discussing formalities and other reform options such
as fair use and limitations on remedies). But see Chris Castle, An Answer for Mr. DeSantis:
"Registration" and the Reformalization of Copyright Under the Copyright Principles Project, Part
1, Music TECH. POLICY (May 27, 2013), https:H/musictechpolicy.wordpress.com/2013/05127/an-
answer-for-mr-desantis-registration-and-the-reformalization-of-copyright-under-the-copyright-
principles-project-part-l/ [http://perma.cc/ZFS4-A6T] (critiquing registration as a way to fix the
problem of orphan works).
87. See Daniel J. Gervais & Renaud Dashiell, The Future of United States Copyright
Formalities: Why We Should Prioritize Recordation, and How to Do It, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L. J.
1459, 1473, 1475-76 (2013).
88. Berne Convention, supra note 21, art. 5(2) ('The enjoyment and the exercise of these
rights shall not be subject to any formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be
independent of the existence of protection in the country of origin of the work.").
89. A collecting society is an organization that collects royalties on behalf of copyright
owners. The simple rationale is that such collectiveness produces efficiencies for those involved
in licensing copyright works. Such organizations are subject to anti-trust or competition law
restraints. For a general discussion of collective management around the world, see DANIEL J.
GERVAIS, COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS (Daniel Gervais ed., 3d
ed. 2015).
90. Sprigman, supra note 84, at 498 n.51 (citing the problem that "it would be
burdensome or even impossible [for record companies] to identify all of the copyrighted music
they own.").
91. Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in
Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 383 n.27 (2005) (suggesting that
formalities "could actually discriminate against individual creators who are unable to carry the
burden of legal counseling and registration"); Brad A. Greenberg, More Than Just a Formality:
Instant Authorship and Copyright's Opt-Out Future in the Digital Age, 59 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1028,
1028 (2012) (discussing the consequences "of shifting from the current opt-out copyright system
to an opt-in regime").
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compared to larger ones.92 Therefore, the problem of creators and
authors not being able to make a living would be exacerbated. Large
commercial entities will actively register and be able to do so, even if
they do not do so perfectly because of transaction costs. Additionally,
formalities, which are related to ownership and the concept of notice
and users knowing who to gain permission from to use a work, cannot
also address other copyright issues relating to the rights given to
owners, such as the scope of the rights to copy, distribute, and
communicate the work to the public.
B. Remedies as a Place for Distinctions
Enforcing copyright has become very difficult. Consequently,
there has been much international movement to increase civil and
criminal enforcement standards.93 While it is true that a right that is
effectively unenforceable is, from a practical standpoint, the
equivalent of no right at all, greater enforcement alone has not
achieved improvements in copyright law. This is partially because
enforcement against infringing copies is not alone a means to achieve
remunerated access. The increase in enforcement standards has
resulted in a debate about the appropriate sort of enforcement and its
relationship to harm done.94 Another possible fix that has emerged is
the suggestion that commercial harm should always be an element of
both enforcement and infringement.95  A standard of a commercial
level of harm is appropriate where that requirement relates to the
appropriate calculation of damages or even if and when an injunction
is necessary. Commercial harm is expressly a requirement, under
92. See, e.g., Marcus Holgersson, Patent Management in Entrepreneurial SMEs: A
Literature Review and an Empirical Study of Innovation Appropriation, Patent Propensity, and
Motives, 43 R&D MANAGEMENT 21, 21 (2013) (showing "that the patent propensity is lower in
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) than in large firms and that patenting as means for
appropriation is of less importance among SMEs").
93. The TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, introduced minimum standards for
enforcement of copyright. Since its formation, there have been bilateral and plurilateral
negotiations to increase enforcement.
94. Christophe Geiger, Challenges for the Enforcement of Copyright in the Online World:
Time for a New Approach, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 704, 728 (P. Torremans ed., 2014) (evaluating the "relevance of these
enforcement strategies in the context of the unauthorised uses of copyrighted works by means of
peer-to-peer file sharing or streaming").
95. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
(ALRC REPORT 122), 7.43, http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/
publications/final report alrc_122_2nd december_2013_.pdf [http://perma.cc/K7P2-3FRA] ("A
common objection to allowing unlicensed third party use of copyright material is that this is
commercial free riding that harms the markets of copyright owners. In the ALRC's view, rather
than automatically exclude all commercial uses, these matters-particularly market
harm-should be considered as part of an assessment of fairness.").
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international rules, when it comes to criminal enforcement.96
Commercial harm is present in many disputes and gives rise to the
basis for an injunction and damages. Injunctions cannot usually be
obtained unless there is an immediate threat of harm for which
damages cannot adequately compensate.97
For some jurisdictions, such as the United States, equating
damages to harm would bring change because of the use of statutory
damages, but the problem of disproportionate statutory damages is
not an issue in many places because statutory damages are not
available in most jurisdictions; they are largely a US phenomenon.98
Developing the law of remedies to ensure that compensation is
commensurate to harm is important for both owners and users, but
not all copyright harms are necessarily commercial.99  Also,
commerciality as a measure of anything is a difficult legal test-what
degree of commerciality is required? Is a small loss or a diversion of
trade enough, or is something close to virtual collapse of a business
required?100
Importantly, there is a fundamental difference between a
requirement of harm to appropriately determine and calibrate
available remedies and a requirement of harm to determine if there is
a right at all. Making harm a prerequisite to infringement-rather
than just a part of the remedy analysis-is the antithesis of a property
right and potentially turns what is a statutory property right in many
jurisdictions into a tort. In tort, damages are not only a remedy, but
proof of damage is also an ingredient of the cause of action.10 1 It is
worth noting that deeming something a property right does not make
that property absolute. Property theorists will disagree over how
property is defined, but all agree that property is made up of the
96. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21; see also Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting
the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009)
[hereinafter China Enforcement], at 7.279.
97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65. The criteria for injunctions, of course, vary between
jurisdictions.
98. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 441 (2009) ('The United States is an
outlier in the global copyright community in giving plaintiffs in copyright cases, the ability to
elect, at any time before final judgment, to receive an award of statutory damages .... ").
99. The most obvious is the right of attribution. See Berne Convention, supra note 21,
art. 6bis.
100. Commerciality as a mechanism is notoriously difficult in intellectual property law.
See China Enforcement, supra note 96.
101. See Ball v. Joy Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 1344, 1365 (S.D. W. Va. 1990) ('CThe essential
elements of a cause of action . . . are (1) a legal obligation of a defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a
violation or breach of that duty or right, and (3) harm or damage to the plaintiff as a proximate
consequence of the violation or breach .... [W]ithout injury or damage to the plaintiff, no right of
action accrues.").
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rights that the property owner has.10 2 Thus, an assertion of property
does not extend the nature of the right even though property rhetoric
tends to lead claimants down that path. And claims to access or to use
another's property equally do not diminish the right. It is the content
of the right that defines the property.103
Another key question is whether specific industries, such as
the music industry, need specific remedies. Making different remedies
available in different circumstances is an important part of the
credibility and robustness of many existing legal systems. Therefore,
different remedies could be appropriate when it comes to copyright.
For example, it could be fruitful to distinguish between authors and
corporate owners enforcing their rights because the consequences of
the harm done may be different. But this distinction cannot be an
absolute rule, as each case should depend on its facts: an author who
depends on revenue from his or her creative works may suffer a
considerable harm from infringement of copyright that is different in
scale and effect to that of a corporate owner.
Making distinctions among remedies is easier than making
distinctions in other areas of copyright. Copyright law is reluctant to
distinguish between creative sectors. This is problematic because the
needs of fine art producers are not the same as computer software
creators or owners of sound recordings. However, the reasons for not
making such distinctions also make sense, particularly in a global
world, where giving what could be interpreted as preferential
treatment to one industry over another can result in violation of
non-discrimination principles10 4 and disrupt key trade theories such as
comparative advantage. 
1 05
There are several other questions that give rise to suggestions
for copyright reform: (1) Should the first sale right be revisited?
102. One approach to defining property is that ownership is a bundle of rights. See James
E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 711, 712 (1996).
Another approach to defining property is that the ability to exclude is the touchstone of property.
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998); Carol M.
Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and
Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 145 (1998) (asserting the importance of the right to exclusion
to the concept of property).
103. See. e.g., A.L.C., Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE L.J. 429, 429
(1922) ("[P]roperty' has ceased to describe any res, or object of sense, at all, and has become
merely a bundle of legal relations-rights, powers, privileges, immunities."); see also Susy
Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, 46
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1149, 1191-93 (2013) (discussing what property means in the context of
trademarks).
104. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, pt. I, arts. 3-4 (detailing the non-
discrimination principles of national treatment and most-favoured nation).
105. See MICHAEL TREBILCOCK ET AL., THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3-6
(4th ed. 2014) (explaining comparative advantage in today's trade law).
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(2) Does there need to be reform of secondary liability and safe
harbors? (3) Do users need rights rather than permissions and fair
uses? However, proposed solutions for these issues are likely to be
partial fixes. While multiple partial fixes have their role, the
copyright problem discussed above requires a structure and whole
approach to reform. This Article suggests that identification of the
core problem plays a pivotal role in such reforms.
IV. EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS AND COPYRIGHT'S CENTRAL
PROBLEM
Exceptions and limitations have become extremely important
because copyright users and businesses depend on them.106 These
exceptions and limitations include fair use and fair dealing and
compulsory licenses.107 As a practical matter, they are the primary
mechanisms balancing the comparatively ill-defined, and arguably
overbroad, approach to copyright's exclusive rights. The importance of
exceptions has grown for many reasons, including that the possibility
of more fully defining the rights through international negotiation
seems politically impossible.108
Many agree that exceptions and limitations are important,0 9
but the disagreement is in the details. One suggestion has been to
develop internationally agreed-upon mandatory exceptions, such as
the 2013 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaty for
access to copyright works for the visually impaired.110 Some countries
have suggested a need for greater specificity of library, educational,
106. P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS To COPYRIGHT, FINAL REPORT 11 (2008),
http://www.eifl.net/sites/default/files/resources/201409/conceiving-an-international-instrument
on limitiations and exceptions to copyright.pdf [http://perma.cc/K63L-674L] [hereinafter
HUGENHOLTZ].
107. Voluntary licenses are also important and may be difficult if the parties involved do
not have a clear foundation or knowledge about the extent of the rights. For a discussion of world
wide collective management, see Daniel J. Gervais, The Landscape of Collective Management
Schemes, 34(4) COLUM. J. L. & THE ARTS 423 (2011).
108. The impossibility in 1996 of reaching an agreement on the scope of the reproduction
right in the WCT, supra note 76, is reflected in the proposed article becoming an "Agreed
Statement" to art. 1(4), rather than an article in the main part of the treaty.
109. See HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 106. But see Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How
Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L. J. 535, 546 (2004).
110. Marrakesh, supra note 64. But see International Literary and Artistic Association
[ALAI], Report of the Alai Ad Hoc Committee on the Proposals to Introduce Mandatory Exceptions
for the Visually Impaired (Feb. 27, 2010), http://www.alai.org/en/assets/files/resolutions/report-
mandatory-exceptions.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZV2U-NRLT] (suggesting that mandatory exceptions
may not be compatible with the Berne Convention). However, I note that, as a principle of
international law, members of a treaty can always agree to amend the treaty.
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museum, and archive exceptions, and so there have been WIPO
negotiations about these topics.111
Fair dealing and fair use are permitted and often unpaid uses
of copyright works, but some permitted uses of works require fees to
be paid.1 12 While some may wish to see the scope of unpaid uses
broadened, and thus the scope of the rights decreased, this is not the
only option.11 3  Permitted uses subject to fees, also known as
compulsory licenses, are an important mechanism that fall in and out
of vogue. Compulsory licenses can be used to solve issues, such as
where creative new distributors seek to circumvent any fees through
technical avoidance mechanisms (i.e., one service devises ways around
the latest case).114 Put differently, compulsory licensing can also
enable new technologies invented by non-copyright owners to flourish.
Although some uses, such as more efficient access and communication
to the public, would be restricted, those uses could be available at a
realistic payment.
1 5
Compulsory licensing has been extensively used in
broadcastingl" 6 and, although the concept has met resistance from
some advocates of the neo-liberal free market, it is potentially a useful
mechanism to balance interests.17  In sum, compulsory licenses
should be used to encourage access, but not at the expense of the
copyright owner's reasonable income. As Professor Daniel Gervais has
said, "[W]hether the Internet will perform adequately in years to come
111. World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Study on Copyright Limitations
and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives, SCCR/29/3 (Nov. 5, 2014),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_29/sccr_29_3.pdf [http://perma.cc/E7U2-
EV8W].
112. Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright's Private Ordering and the "Next Great Copyright
Act," 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1595, 1601 (2014).
113. See, e.g., Lohmann, supra note 53 (arguing that private copying should be a fair
use).
114. See, e.g., MGM v. Grokster, 125 U.S. 2764 (2005); WNET v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d
676 (2d Cir. 2013); Cablevision Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.
2008); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
115. KEITH MASKUS, PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC PROBLEMS: THE GLOBAL ECONOMICS
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 222 (Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ. 2012) ('The major music labels,
film producers and book and periodical publishers may oppose such ideas because they would
replace the traditional control system.").
116. In the United States, the statutory provisions are: 17 U.S.C. § 111, statutory license
for secondary transmissions by cable systems; § 112, statutory license for making ephemeral
recordings; § 114, statutory license for the public performance of sound recordings by means of a
digital audio transmission; § 115, license to make and distribute phonorecords; § 118,
compulsory license for the use of certain works in connection with non-commercial broadcasting;
§ 119, statutory license for secondary transmissions for satellite carriers; § 122 statutory license
for secondary transmissions by satellite carriers for local retransmissions; and § 1003, statutory
obligation for distribution of digital audio recording devices and media.
117. See generally COMPULSORY LICENSING: PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES AND WAYS
FORWARD (Reto M. Hilty & Kung-Chung Liu eds., 2015).
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as a marketplace for copyrighted material is in large measure a
function of whether licensing can work.""18 The cautionary note might
be that compulsory licenses need to be appropriately devised; they do
not need to be complicated.119 Their proper use can potentially satisfy
the consumer "we-want-this-technology" arguments and allow for a
greater variety of businesses that provide innovative and responsive
technologies to consumers. There is no doubt that many aspects of
licensing, including identification of the contents of a repertoire, could
be improved, including solving difficulties about identifying what is in
a repertoire.120  Effective and functional licensing is important;
however, licensing is a means to exploit rights. Licenses are
sometimes likely to gloss over some details as to whether an action
amounts to copyright infringement or a permitted fair use (it is easier
to pay than to argue). Without a more nuanced consideration of the
scope of the rights, it is difficult to see how the central problem
discussed above can be resolved.
Just as the absence of exceptions is a problem, overreach of
copyright's exclusive rights is equally problematic. At the heart of
many current disputes is the difference between reproduction,
distribution, communication, and legitimate exceptions to those
rights.'21  The notion that every use of a work is copying,122
distribution,'23 or communication (including public performance)'24 of
some kind has elements of overreach. The once appropriately
118. Statement of Prof. Daniel Gervais, supra note 40, at 11.
119. See MASKUS, supra note 115, at 221-22.
120. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. In 2014, Universal Music claimed to
license its worldwide repertoire to Pandora. Some songwriters doubt Universal has the rights to
do this. I am grateful to Eddie Schwartz, President of SOCAN (Society of Composers, Authors
and Music Publishers of Canada), for drawing this example to my attention.
121. The central issue in, for example, WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 500 (2d
Cir. 2013), rev'd sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos., v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014), was whether
the activities of Aereo infringed the public performance right, rather than the reproduction right.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
122. The Berne Convention, supra note 76, art. 1, provides, "Authors of literary and
artistic works protected by this Convention shall have the exclusive right of authorizing the
reproduction of these works, in any manner or form."
123. WCT, supra note 76, art. 6, provides, "Authors of literary and artistic works shall
enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public of the original and
copies of their works through sale or other transfer of ownership."
124. WCT, supra note 76, art. 8, provides, "Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles
11(1)(ii), llbis(1)(i) and (ii), llter(1)(ii), 14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1) of the Berne Convention, authors of
literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to
the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public
of their works in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and
at a time individually chosen by them."
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open-textured125-and thus all-encompassing-scope of "copy,"
"reproduction," and "distribution" may now be problematic. This
Article does not suggest that copyright owners should not have rights.
However, the progress of technology is making exclusive rights too
technologically specific and, combined with the expansion of
conflicting interest groups, the rights must be better framed. This is
especially true because, as noted, many authors, who are at heart of
copyright's raison d'etre, cannot make a living.
The extent to which the exclusive rights (reproduction,
distribution, and communication) should be separated is questionable.
The rights have been framed broadly in an open-textured manner so
that some new technologies are captured. Reproduction, for example,
is an infringement no matter what copying technology is used. In
comparison, exceptions (excluding perhaps a broad US-style fair use
right) are more technology or purpose specific. The rights, however,
are no longer as technologically neutral as they may once have been.
While the distinctions may have made sense historically, they have in
many ways become technologically specific. Businesses are creating
models for dissemination that seek to avoid all of these rights while
using copyright subject matter. Ideally, copyright should strive to be
technologically neutral. Technological neutrality is hard to achieve,
but is an important goal because it can contribute to a durable
framework. Technological neutrality is not straightforward because
the nature of technology is that its path is disruptive and
unpredictable. As WIPO Director General Francis Gurry has said, a
principle of copyright should be its technological neutrality:
126
The purpose of copyright is not to influence technological possibilities for creative
expression or the business models built on those technological possibilities. Nor is its
purpose to preserve business models established under obsolete or moribund
technologies. Its purpose is, I believe, to work with any and all technologies for the
production and distribution of cultural works, and to extract some value from the
cultural exchanges made possible by those technologies to return to creators and
performers and the business associates engaged by them to facilitate the cultural
exchanges through the use of the technologies. Copyright should be about promoting
cultural dynamism, not preserving or promoting vested business interests.
If the goal of technological neutrality is "promoting cultural
dynamism," then an important qualification to the desirability of
technological neutrality is that it should not be a mechanism to
125. Interpretation of open-textured terms raises issues about appropriate sources to be
used in interpretation. If the meaning of a term is outside the area of law at issue, then an
additional international source should be used. For a discussion of this internationally
recognized interpretation principle, see Susy Frankel, WTO Application of "the Customary Rules
of Interpretation of Public International Law" to Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 365
(2006).
126. Gurry, Blue Skies, supra note 75.
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increase the scope of rights and decrease the scope of exceptions, or
vice versa, if either unreasonably impacts such cultural dynamism.127
In sum, there is an important relationship between rights and
exceptions. If international law does not frame that relationship well,
significant and influential jurisdictions, such as the United States,
should do a better job of doing so.
V. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION
International copyright law is complex in its detail and in its
relationship with national laws. These complexities include national
laws giving effect to the internationally agreed minimum standards
and where national law allows for exceptions to those standards that
they comply with the internationally agreed frameworks for
exceptions. An important aspect of understanding and dealing with
the international complexity is the interpretation of international law
at both international and domestic levels.
A. The Layers of International Law
There are several layers that together form international
intellectual property law, including its relationship with national
laws. Even though domestic law is distinct from international law,
domestic copyright protection is the first layer of relevant law to
international intellectual property law. Negotiators of international
agreements often use their national positions to negotiate the scope of
international law and national laws, which often frame the words
chosen in international agreements.128 Importantly however, national
positions alone do not determine the interpretation of international
law, despite frequent attempts to the contrary. 29 This is because a
negotiated agreement is unlikely to be an exact national position;
rather, it reflects a compromise between national positions. That
compromise will often be an agreed minimum standard.130
127. See Ruth Okediji, Toward An International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 168 (2000).
128. A study of the drafting history of the TRIPS Agreement reveals this. See generally
DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (4th ed. 2012).
129. See, e.g., Letter from Eli Lily & Co. to Gov't of Can. 3 (Nov. 7, 2012),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawl172.pdf [http://perma.cc/PQ9U-
LDVQ] (stating that the correct interpretation of Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement is US and
EU law, because they are the WTO members who proposed the provision in the draft). First, this
is not a correct approach to interpretation of international agreements as it does not follow the
Vienna Convention rules. Second, EU and US law are not the same.
130. As the TRIPS Agreement demonstrates in its minimum standards approach. See
also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 1, 1 1.
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Consequently, compliance with the agreement can be achieved via
several approaches, even though all reach the same end.
131
The second layer of law relevant to international intellectual
property law is how national jurisdictions deal with cross-border
disputes (private international law). The third layer is how those
national laws are reflected in international law and occasionally
regional agreements (public international law). The key international
treaties-the Berne Convention,132 the TRIPS Agreement,133 and the
WIPO Internet Treaties13 4 -together require member countries to
protect original copyright works and to provide exclusive rights to
copyright owners, particularly the rights of reproduction, distribution,
and communication.
Even if the words in a treaty are adopted from a national
position, they then become an international standard, which requires
interpretation not based on the originating jurisdiction, but according
to the rules of international interpretation.135 Also, a national position
should reflect an economically and culturally acceptable position for
that nation-even though such a position likely lacks universal
applicability. In sum, international and national copyright law
overlap because national practices will inform, but not determine,
both the negotiated text and its interpretation.
The TRIPS Agreement provides an international dispute
settlement mechanism.136 Importantly, dispute settlement cannot be
used to fill any gaps of the TRIPS Agreement, but only to interpret
that which has been agreed; rather at the World Trade Organization
(WTO), any additions to the TRIPS Agreement must be done through
Ministerial negotiations.137 In the meantime, domestic legislatures
131. This is the function of minimum standards. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21,
art. 1, 1.
132. Berne Convention, supra note 21.
133. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21.
134. The Internet Treaties are the WCT, supra note 76, and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), adopted in Geneva on December 20, 1996.
135. See VCLT, supra note 67.
136. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 64. The rules of dispute settlement at the
WTO are found in, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
137. DSU article 3.2 provides: "The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The
Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the
covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings
of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements." And, DSU article 19.2 states: "[I]n their findings and recommendations, the panel
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and courts must interpret local law. Thus, it is often the job of a
national court to fill any gaps. In many countries, international
norms are used to guide interpretation of the law. While this
methodology is not common in the United States, international
compliance should be important. This is especially true because the
United States is the leading demander of strong international
copyright norms in multilateral, bilateral, and plurilateral
negotiations.138
B. Interpretation at the WTO
In light of the above-described framework, the international
copyright problem is exacerbated by a deficit in sustained and
consistent interpretation of the international rules. The central rule
of treaty interpretation, found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT) is that treaties must be interpreted "in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.139
This seemingly simple rule is actually complex, and its last part is
surprisingly misunderstood or not fully applied.140 This is perhaps
because the object and purpose of the international protection of
copyright is not one-dimensional. It is not just about protecting
copyright; it is also about the role of copyright law in allowing fair
uses of copyright works. This complexity has not been reflected in
WTO dispute settlement reports suggesting that the panels have
misinterpreted and consequently misapplied the VCLT.
The dispute settlement panel report of the one copyright
dispute heard at the WTO, US-110(5),141 did not do particularly well
in terms of fully utilizing this interpretation rule. The case involved
two US copyright exceptions: the business- and home-style exceptions
for playing certain broadcasts in retail establishments and
and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements."
138. See Intellectual Property, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/intellectual-property [https://perma.cc/A2M4-CCP9] ("[The] USTR's
[US Trade Representative's] Office of Intellectual Property and Innovation (IPN) uses a wide
range of bilateral and multilateral trade tools to promote strong intellectual property laws and
effective enforcement worldwide, reflecting the importance of intellectual property and
innovation to the future growth of the U.S. economy. Key areas of work include: the negotiation,
implementation, and monitoring of intellectual property provisions of trade agreements; bilateral
and regional engagement hrough such vehicles as the annual 'Special 301' review and report
and numerous IP dialogues with trading partners.").
139. VCLT, supra note 67, art. 31 (emphasis added).
140. See Frankel, supra note 68.
141. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, WTO Doc.
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter US-110(5)].
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restaurants.142  The WTO dispute settlement panel found that the
latter was TRIPS compliant while the former was not because,
broadly, it was too commercial.143 Even though the business-style
exception was not TRIPS compliant, it remains part of US law, and
the United States paid compensation to the European Union as the
winning party.144 The panel used the copyright three-step test found
in the TRIPS Agreement to analyze whether the US exception was
compliant with TRIPS.145 The first step of the test requires exceptions
to be for certain special cases. An interpretation of "certain special
cases" should allow for narrow exceptions that are limited to specific
purposes such as research, but the panel's approach in the US-110(5)
dispute did not take that approach. Rather, the panel articulated an
interpretation of "certain" as meaning "limited."146 The three-step test
was designed as a guide for national legislators.147 Seen in that light,
"certain special cases" is a requirement that an exception must either
have a special purpose or in some other way be limited in scope. The
WTO dispute settlement panel in the US-110(5) dispute focused on the
limit in scope and specifically rejected the underlying purpose of the
national law as being central to its deliberations. The panel stated:
142. Id. 2.4, 2.9. For discussion of this dispute, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward
Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the "Three-Step Test'for Copyright
Exceptions, REVUE INTERNATIONALE Du DROIT D'AUTEUR, Jan. 2001, at 3.
143. US-110(5), supra note 141, 6.116.
144. There are several critiques of the US-110(5) WTO dispute. See, e.g., Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without Discriminating: Complying with the
Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 445, 448 (2007)
(discussing how the decision failed to take into account that the relevant copyright exception was
a flexibility introduced into US law to, at least in part, mitigate against the effects of the
extension of the term of copyright).
145. The TRIPS Agreement provides that "[m]embers shall confine limitations or
exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 13. This is derived from the Berne Convention,
which was also relevant to the dispute and provides that "[i]t shall be a matter for legislation in
the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases,
provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author." Berne Convention, supra note
21, art. 9(2). In copyright, there are several versions of what is called the three-step test. In
addition to Berne and TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, there is the WCT, supra note 76, art.
10(1)-(2), and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), art. 16(2), adopted in
Geneva on December 20, 1996. The differences may result in different interpretations, but the
key features of the three steps are similar.
146. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WTO Doc.
WT/DS160JR (adopted July 27, 2000).
147. After all, it is a framework that begins "members shall . TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 21. For the full wording of the test, see id. For discussion of the test, see Christophe
Geiger, Daniel J. Gervais, & Martin Senftleben, The Three-Step-Test Revisited: How to Use the
Test's Flexibility in National Copyright Law, 29 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 581 (2014).
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
In our view, the first condition of Article 13 requires that a limitation or exception in
national legislation should be clearly defined and be narrow in its scope and reach. On
the other hand, a limitation or exception may be compatible with the first condition even
if it pursues a special purpose whose underlying legitimacy in a normative sense cannot
be discerned. The wording of Article 13's first condition does not imply passing a
judgement on the legitimacy of exceptions in dispute. However, public policy exceptions
stated by law-makers when enacting a limitation or exception may be useful from a
factual perspective for making inferences about the scope of a limitation or an exception
or the clarity of its definition. 
1 48
It is arguable that that panel was wrong in focusing on the
scope not least of all because the word "certain" is not limited in its
definition to scope. Further, in the non-copyright three-step tests of
the TRIPS Agreement, the words "limited exceptions" were used,
suggesting a different meaning for the chosen words in the
copyright-related three-step test.149
Another problem of the WTO dispute settlement panel's report
is the lack of differentiation in its analysis of what is relevant to each
step, particularly steps two and three. The step of this test most
relevant for this Article is step two, which holds that an exception
"must not conflict with the normal exploitation."'' 50
Step two is probably the most restrictive step in that it curbs
the freedom to implement exceptions. In the US-110(5) report, the
panel said that "normal exploitation" involved consideration of the
forms of exploitation that generate income and those which are likely
to be of considerable importance in the future.151 Thus, normal is both
empirical and normative. However, if the scope of normal exploitation
is different from the rights given, then it is difficult to see what
"normative" really amounts to. Accordingly, there is a problem if the
scope of each of the exclusive rights of copyright are not well defined.
The apparent default to everything known or unknown is not a
durable legal principle. And it is this difficulty that lies at the heart of
what this Article has termed the "international copyright problem."
C. Normal Exploitation and the Central Problem
The approach of the WTO panel in the US-110(5) dispute
indicates that normal exploitation can capture new technologies.152
148. Panel Report, supra note 146; see also 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND
764 (2nd ed. 2006).
149. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 17, 30.
150. This has an important relationship to the third step, which states that an exception
must not "unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder." See TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 21, art. 13.
151. Panel Report, supra note 146.
152. Id.
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This, in part, arises from the open-textured nature of rights. For the
most part, this is understandable. An author should not be isolated
from future exploitations of their work simply because the technology
used for that exploitation is unknown. The WTO panel, however, was
not as forward-looking with the exceptions. Its analysis treated any
exception as requiring some precision in its scope and reach and thus
the panel considered exceptions are more likely to be limited to known
technology.15 3 As a practical matter, it is problematic if "normal
exploitation" in reference to rights includes new technologies, but
there can be no new exceptions relating to new technology on the basis
that such technologies were not foreseen and thus not normal. Such
an outcome should not result from a robust and VCLT-guided
interpretation of the three-step test.154 A correct interpretation must
involve consideration of both existing norms of exploitation and those
not yet exploited, whether involving rights or exceptions. From an
international interpretation perspective, exceptions should be possible
where there are relevant exclusive rights. This sort of approach gives
rise to the possibility that national courts and legislatures can create
exceptions relevant to new technologies that are compatible with the
three-step test.155 Fundamentally, such an approach to interpretation
recognizes and brings to life the "object and purpose" of the TRIPS
Agreement.156
The interpretation of exclusive rights should be balanced by an
interpretation of the scope of any relevant exceptions (i.e., the
meaning of normal exploitation).1 57  This does not mean that
exceptions determine these rights. Rather, exceptions and rights
should function together and create a working system around
copyright to reflect the object and purpose of copyright. Put
differently, copyright exceptions are not bites out of the copyright
apple, but copyright is a cloud that is shaped by its limitations and
exceptions. The important point about the second step is that
153. See id.
154. See VCLT, supra note 67.
155. See Geiger, supra note 147.
156. See Frankel, supra note 68.
157. Susy Frankel, Digital Copyright and Culture, 40 J. ARTS MGMT, L. AND SOC'Y
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 140 (2010). A compatible proposal is "the reverse 3 step test," which requires you
to determine what is unfair in order to determine what is fair. See Daniel J. Gervais, Towards A
New Core International Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 1, 29 (2005) ("Any use that demonstrably and substantially reduces financial benefits that
the copyright owner can reasonably expect to receive under normal commercial circumstances
would be 'unfair' without authorization. How one measures unfairness and interference with
normal commercial exploitation in this context is fundamental. I suggest that the question
should not be whether a user got 'value' without paying, but whether the user should have
obtained the content through a normal commercial transaction.").
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whatever normal exploitation amounts to as part of the exceptions
framework, it should be perfectly correlated with the exclusive rights.
In other words, normal exploitation, as an exclusive right and as a
consideration for exceptions, should not mean different things.1 58 Both
may change over time.'59 What this Article suggests instead is that
the appropriate relationship between rights and exceptions should be
embedded overtly into international law, and existing treaties can and
should be interpreted that way both internationally and domestically.
The combination of the challenges of technology to the framing
of rights and the difficulties with the three-step test together
contribute to a framework problem with copyright. That framework
problem arises because, rather than dealing with the relationship
between the rights and exceptions and limitations in a wholesale
manner where they work to balance each other, they are in conflict.
The conflict is problematic because exceptions are too unpredictable
and inconsistent, and owners' rights are not clearly defined. To be
clear, litigants will continue to battle over exceptions and rights, and
this is justifiable. But it is problematic when the relationship between
the two is unclear in the international and legislative framework.
Until there is a holistic discussion at an international level,
greater attention to interpretation of international agreements (both
internationally and nationally) should help resolve the difficulties.
The key is to recognize that context, as well as object and purpose, are
the normative underpinnings that support the creation of rights and
exceptions. Both the appropriate scope of normal exploitation and the
ability to adjust copyright flexibilities to local needs are important and
should constitute a more significant part of the interpretation process.
In sum, copyright requires not only rights-but also
exceptions-for aspects of the object and purpose of the TRIPS
Agreement to be realized.160 The ability to claim rights and utilize
exceptions should be improved if normal exploitation was given better,
and more internationally consistent, parameters. By this statement,
this Article does not advocate for what might amount to excess
harmonization where there is only one method to comply with
158. The third step of the three-step test may include something else because it refers to
legitimate interests, which WTO panels have interpreted to mean legal and some de facto
interests. See, e.g., Panel Report, Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WTO
Doc. WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000).
159. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Tailoring Copyright to Social Production, 12 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 309 (2011) (explaining how users of copyright works change and thus the
framework for rights and uses needs change).
160. E.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, at pmbl. ("Recognizing the underlying public
policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including
developmental and technological objectives .... "). Realizing such objectives is not possible in the
current framework without utilizing limitations and exceptions.
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international standards. An important flexibility of the TRIPS
Agreement is that "[m]embers shall be free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of th[e] Agreement
within their own legal system and practice.' 161 Although minimum
standards are a preferable norm because they give the appropriate
degree of national autonomy, there are some limits to this approach.
The flexibility of the minimum standards should not be interpreted to
mean different standards unless there really is no agreed minimum.
An example of no agreed minimum is if there is no rule, such as for
exhaustion of rights and parallel importing.162 Examples of agreed
minimums are the Berne reproduction right 163 and the WIPO
Copyright Treaty (WCT) "making available right."164 Each of these
gives rise to different implementations in national laws and potential
disputes between states over their scope and whether any particular
implementation is compliant with the relevant agreement.
Significant national differences have arisen where there is no
agreed scope of definition, such as the meaning of "reproduction,"
which is not explicitly defined in the Berne Convention.65 The
absence of agreed meaning will result in several possible ways in
which the minimum standard is reached. The same situation arises in
relation to the WCT. The WCT's obligations include a broad
communication right, which provides that:
[A] uthors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the
making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public
may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them. 
16 6
The litigator's strategy for interpretation of rights has often
involved reliance on distinctions between reproduction, distribution,
and communication. The difference between these rights is both
important and misleading. Fine nuances of history in one jurisdiction
do not explain international obligation, which is not designed to create
silos so that there are inexplicable gaps between the rights at
domestic law that are not reflected in the broad sweep of the
international obligations. Rather, the international obligation
161. Id. art. 1(1).
162. Because of the failure to agree on a rule, the TRIPS Agreement provides there can
be no dispute settlement on the matter of exhaustion of rights. See id. art. 6.
163. Berne Convention, supra note 21, art. 9.
164. WCT, supra note 76, art. 6.
165. An equivalent in patent law is the meaning of "inventive step" in the TRIPS
Agreement. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 27 n.5; see also GRAEME B. DINWOODIE &
ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME (2012).
166. WCT, supra note 76, art. 8 (emphasis added).
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requires a VCLT approach that looks at the ordinary meaning of the
right in light of the treaty's context, object, and purpose. So if one
were to ask if the exclusive rights under US law give full effect to the
internationally agreed rights relating to communication to the public,
the process of interpretation would involve application of the VCLT
rules.167 It is difficult to see how the communication right can be
avoided by using one technology rather than another.
"Communication to the public" includes first "both wire and wireless
means," which seems to encompass all means, and second, it includes
making available even for individual reception.168
As discussed above, even if normal exploitation is broad, that
feature does not mean it should not be subject to compulsory licenses
or fair use; if anything, the broadness speaks to the need to make sure
that limitations and exceptions are effective for users and fair for
authors and owners.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the celebrated British journalist Caitlin Moran pointed out
in her essay In Defence of Rupert Murdoch's Paywall, no one expects
holidays or beer to be free just because they are available on the
Internet.169 She argues that if people do not pay for journalism and
other creative outputs, they will likely be unavailable in the way in
which we have grown accustomed. Equally, if access is restricted,
people will not pay. For example, it is hard to prohibit free
retransmission when retransmission for a reasonable price is
unavailable in a country or locality.
A business model based on free input of copyright work and
payment for output is questionable. While exceptions have their role,
this role is not the evisceration of copyright. If copyright is a free
input to a business, then normal exploitation's value is nil. That is not
appropriate because the system cannot survive non-payment to
authors.170 However, the other extreme in which copyright owners
should be free to charge what they want or to unduly restrict access is
equally untenable. This balance is why compulsory licensing and
better voluntary licensing structures must be important.
167. See VCLT, supra note 67; H.R. REP. No. 109-749, 109th Cong. (2007) (explaining the
US compliance with the right of communication).
168. WCT, supra note 76, art. 8.
169. See generally CAITLIN MORAN, In Defence of Rupert Murdoch's Paywall, in
MORANTHOLOGY (2012). The paywall is for access to The Times online. The Times is a venerable
British newspaper.
170. Business models usually require that their inputs are paid for.
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As far as legal issues are concerned, exceptions and licensing
regimes can be hard to create because of the absence of technical
expertise or the unsuitability of courts to fill the gaps.171 This can
have a chilling effect. Interpretation alone will not remove this effect;
however, use of better interpretative methods should contribute to the
alleviation of these difficulties. This is because interpretation is not
purely a dispute matter. Better interpretation is not only important
for resolving disputes, but it is also relevant for framing laws and thus
tackling the international copyright problem at a national level.
There are three steps to addressing the international copyright
problem and creating durable solutions:
Step one: Normal exploitation as it relates to exclusive rights
should be better framed. This is so that normal exploitation can
both reflect what authors creatives and owners need and so
that it can be appropriately balanced though licensing and fair
uses. The gaps in exclusive rights should not be interpreted so
that they incentivize avoidance, but the whole should be
interpreted so as to incentivize creativity.
Step two: The ability for countries to utilize what flexibility
there is in rights and to create exceptions and limitations for
national economic and social goals is part of the purpose of the
international agreements and should be factored into the
interpretation process. Such national approaches are parts of
the object and purpose of copyright law.
Step three: National rules and economic and social goals also
have international impacts, particularly where copyright goods
are traded across borders. This means that calibrated
exceptions should be aimed towards national goals in
accordance with international obligations. Local and
international goals can be competing objectives, but
interpretation should support them working in tandem.
To date, the international community has not achieved these
three steps. Can the United States (or indeed the European Union or
any other major economy) create copyright equilibrium on the home
front that it can also export to the world?
171. In many countries, fair use as a doctrine to be delineated by courts is not a viable
option because the number of cases is de minimis and the culture is not to settle such matters in
courts. Participants in those markets often rely on disputes decided in other countries to
determine the scope of their laws or even, in as far as is practicable, ignore possible
infringements.
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